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Abstract!
In Part 3, I will discuss the problems of inertia and gravity in Leibniz, and present three 
conjectures: (I) If Leibniz were really ready to insist on relativity, he would have to assert 
the relativity of inertial motion. (II) In Leibniz’s theories of dynamics and geometry, there 
was a struggle between his predilection for straight line and his adherence to an optimality 
principle. (III) Gravity, as well as inertia, can be considered as a universal feature of the 
world, so that the foundation of both may have a common root. Further, drawing on the 
results in Part 1 and Part 2, I will argue for the need of a unified interpretation of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics and dynamics. My three conjectures as regards Leibniz’s possible treatment of 
inertia and gravity are proposed along a unified interpretation, in terms of my 
informational reconstruction of Leibniz’s philosophy. Finally, the most important features 
of the informational interpretation are summarized. The synopsis of the whole paper (Part 
1, 2, and 3) is added.!
31. Newton’s Bucket and Inertia!
In this Part 3, we will try a few conjectures, rather than expositions and 
interpretations of Leibniz’s view based on his texts. My first concern is the law of 
inertia. Despite my assertion in Section 30 (Part 2) of the “new scenario” for 
establishing the law of inertia (and other laws), it seems there are further important 
problems to be discussed.!
Leibniz repeatedly asserted that the law of inertia is fundamental and based on the 
nature of things. But I have been unable to find any documents in which Leibniz 
discussed the foundation of the law of inertia. It is true that when he talked about 
the active and passive forces, he included inertia (a kind of resistance) in the 
passive force. But this, by itself, does not establish the law of inertia, as used in his 
dynamics. What he has left for us is a few hints and ideas which may become as a 
clue for our conjectures. But these conjectures may be worthy to try, since they may 
serve to clarify the problems and potentialities of his dynamics and metaphysics. 
Moreover, we know, thanks to our hindsight, both inertia and gravity are closely 
connected with space and time. This may add more significance to our conjectures, 
despite my own admission that they are far from “well founded.”!
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In order to begin our conjectures as regards the “Leibnizian foundation” of the law 
of inertia, we should not forget the problem of Newton’s Bucket. Although Clarke 
alluded to this problem in his 4th Reply (Alexander 1956, 48), by explicitly referring 
to Newton’s Definition 8 (Scholium added to it contains a detailed description of 
the Bucket experiment), Leibniz disregarded this, simply by saying as follows:!
I find nothing in the Eighth Definition of the Mathematical Principles of 
Nature, nor in the Scholium belonging to it, that proves or can prove, the 
reality of space in itself. (5th Paper, sect. 53, Alexander 1956, 74)!
This is one of the most disappointing passages in their correspondence. It may be 
worthwhile to state my reason for this disappointment, because Newton’s Bucket 
has close connections with the law of inertia, as well as with the problems of space 
and time (for a detailed discussion of the problem of rotation for the relational 
theory, see Earman 1989, ch. 4.).!
It is Huygens (Leibniz’s mentor of mathematics in Paris) who first clarified the 
nature of centrifugal force arising from a rotation. Thus we may assume that 
Leibniz must have known well about Huygens’ clarification. Let me briefly explain. 
The following Figure 20 shows a (horizontally) rotating disc, where an observer on 
the disc releases a small ball at B. How does this motion of the ball look to the 
observer on the disc and to another at rest outside of the disc?!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 20: Huygens on Centrifugal Force!
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Huygens combines two observations from the disc and the observer at rest, a fine 
relativistic thinking. Although the observer at rest says the ball moved along the 
tangent at B, the observer on the disc sees a different path, along B’C. Now what 
does this show?!
With a closer look of the same phenomena (Figure 21), within a short time interval, 
Huygens found the same phenomena as Galileo’s free fall! And from this, he 
deduced the magnitude of the centrifugal force acting on the ball (as regards the 
nature of trajectories B1C1, B2C2, etc., see Bertoloni Meli 1993, 46-47).!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 21: Huygens found a Motion similar to Free Fall!
This discovery has been told by many people, and my version owes a great deal to 
Barbour’s (2001, 487-488; Figures are adapted from Uchii 2006, 63). What is clear 
from this discovery is that the inertial motion (for the observer at rest)  BC seems as 
an accelerated motion B’C for the observer on the disc (in motion). Here is a sort of 
relativity, but the crucial point is that without the assumption that BC is an inertial 
motion on a tangential straight line, Huygens’ inference may lose its validity. Some 
assumption, such as the law of inertia, or an inertial system as a reference frame, 
must be presupposed. Notice that we are here concerned with laws of physics, not 
geometry alone, and also with physical space, not geometrical space alone. The same 
holds for Huygens’ beautiful results as regards collisions (see Barbour 2001, 9.4 and 
9.5).!
Of course, the need for such presuppositions does not change at all for Newton too. 
He could claim that “the effects which distinguish absolute from  relative motion 
are, the forces of receding from the axis of circular motion” (Newton 1962, vol. 1, 10, 
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Cajori's English edition of Principia). Newton merely presupposed absolute space 
and time with a definite metric, and that was the trick for easily presenting the 
three laws of motion. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the centrifugal force 
arises because of the law of inertia, as well as by the rotation.!
Thus, if Huygens and Leibniz want to say that Newton’s assumption of absolute 
space is redundant or unnecessary, insisting on the relativity of motion in general, 
the burden of proof is on them, and they have to consider not only the seeming non- 
relativity of rotation but also the law of inertia. Leibniz, in particular, has to clarify the 
ground of the law of inertia, together with the nature of space and time, including 
their metric. That was the topic we discussed in Part 2 (there, my discussion was 
restricted to inertial systems, remember). Leibniz’s attempts were incomplete, to say 
the least. And what I wish to point out here is that, without such preparations, he 
could not give any satisfactory answer to Clarke and Newton. His allegation of the 
“wholesale” relativity of motion does not help at all. !
Here, my first conjecture comes in. !
(Conjecture I) If he were really ready to insist on relativity, he would have to 
assert the relativity of inertial motion.!
That is to say, he should have insisted: Viewed from the observer on the disc, the 
“inertial motion for the rest observer” is not inertial, but an accelerated motion. In 
order to see this, just imagine that the observer at B on the disc regards his own 
motion BB’ as inertial, along a straight line (notice B is moving with a uniform speed). 
Then, the trajectory BC of the small ball should look not straight at all but curved and 
accelerated vis-à-vis his own motion! See the following Figure 22 (and recall Figure 
15 of Part 2, Section 29), which is a sort of coordinate transformation.!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 22: Relativity of Inertial Motion?!
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I am not saying Figure 21 and Figure 22 are “equivalent,” of course; for suggesting 
anything of this sort, we need differential geometry, and the notion of general 
covariance together with a coordinate transformation (briefly, the law must remain the 
same whatever coordinate system we may adopt for expressing it), which were first 
used by Einstein’s theory of gravity (1915). We can point this out because of our 
hindsight, of course. No one in Leibniz’s days could see this, despite the fact that 
Galileo’s “inertia” was a circular motion! But once we see this, we can clearly 
understand that there is a sort of inconsistency between Leibniz’s two conspicuous 
assertions, the law of inertia and the relativity of motion. The crucial question is: in 
view of Leibniz’ persistent claim that all motions are relative (at least 
mathematically), how can he claim also that inertial motions and straight motions have 
a special status in his dynamics? Thus, he definitely has to argue for the ground of the 
law of inertia. That may have opened a new line of research as regards inertia, 
circular motion, and curvilinear motion in general. The crucial point should be the 
notion of invariance, according to our hindsight. Let me indicate two options:!
(i) If he wishes to insist that inertial motion is straight, and straight motions 
have a special status, “based on the nature of body (or ultimately, of 
monad),” he has to show why this is so. This option is not necessarily 
prescribed by the results of Analysis Situs, because a curvature of space is 
possible. Moreover, optimality does not imply straightness.!
(ii) If Leibniz were ready to admit the relativity of inertial motion, he would 
have to point out what remains invariant, in such a coordinate transformation 
as the one from Figure 21 to Figure 22. (Notice that a geodesic, as a surrogate 
of an inertial path, can be determined even in a curved space-time.)!
I am not trying to say that Leibniz was in a position to make a choice of these 
possibilities. But I imagine that Leibniz might have felt uneasy about a “possible 
gap” contained in (i).!
!
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32. Straight or Shortest?!
It seems Leibniz’s persistent adherence to the law of inertia (the uniform motion on 
a straight line) is closely related with his metaphysical view. At the same time, he 
often appeals to optimality, both in metaphysics and dynamics. The problem here is 
that it is not clear whether he was conscious of the gap between straightness and 
optimality. Since this seems crucial to me for understanding many problems (mostly 
unsolved) Leibniz had to face, I may make it my second conjecture:!
(Conjecture II) In Leibniz’s theories of dynamics and geometry, there was a 
struggle between his predilection for straight line and his adherence to an 
optimality principle.!
As regards Leibniz’s predilection for a motion on a straight line, we have already 
seen in Section 7, Part 1 of this paper. There I said that this feature is 
“indispensable” for understanding his theory of motion, without any criticism. The 
most important textual evidence (from Specimen Dynamicum) may be repeated (this 
time with an abbreviation) here:!
since only force and nisus [effort] arising from it exist at any moment …, and 
since every nisus tends to in a straight line, it follows that all motion is either 
rectilinear or composed of rectilinear motions. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 135)!
Since we have clarified in the preceding Section 31 the problem Leibniz should 
have considered, in order to harmonize the law of inertia with relativity, we are 
now in a much better position to discuss this. First, we have to point out that this 
view appeared after Leibniz’s work (Tentamen, 1689) on planetary motion was 
published. In this work, Leibniz actually tried to reconstruct a planetary motion in 
terms of the “polygonal representation” composed of rectilinear motions. This 
work, and other related manuscripts were thoroughly examined by Bertoloni Meli 
(1993). And his judgement is certainly worth quoting. He asks, whether the 
polygonal representation corresponds to the real trajectory of the body.!
The answer to this question can only be a resounding no, and the reason is 
straightforward. The choice of the specific polygon entails a degree of 
arbitrariness depending on the progression of the variables. (Bertoloni Meli 
1993, 83)!
However, Bertoloni Meli distinguishes mathematical grounds and physical 
grounds. And his judgment is qualified as follows:!
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Leibniz’s mathematical  representations of curvilinear motion are fictitious. 
The Polygonal curve, however, corresponds in principle to physical laws 
involved, rather than the infinitesimal details of the trajectory of the body. 
Moreover, …, for Leibniz change takes place not instantaneously, but 
gradually and in accordance with the law of continuity. Thus each vertex 
ought to represent a smooth rather than a sudden transition. (Ibid.)!
I think this is a fair judgement, in pointing out that, despite the mathematical 
arbitrariness, the Leibnizian reconstruction can give, physically, a smooth motion of 
a planet. But all the same, the straightness of the action of a force seems to be 
assumed a priori, presumably in conformity with the law of inertia. Recall that, for 
Leibniz, a force [nisus] is acting even in inertial motions (Section 4, Part 1). Leibniz 
may have intended that the straight inertial motion can result (with no other 
intervening actions) from this straightness of nisus, but this would be merely 
question begging. That may well be the reason why he still tried, in his last days, to 
define a straight line based on his Analysis Situs. !
In this paper, we have referred to De Risi’s book (2007) several times. In Chapter 2 
of his book, he begins to examine Leibniz’s treatment of a straight line (226-264). By 
going through De Risi’s detailed examination, we may be surprised and “riddled 
by Leibniz’s numberless, exhausting sprays of definitions and corrections” (226). 
This can be ascertained even by examining a much simpler description in Initia 
Rerum, to which I referred in Section 30, Part 2. There, in relation to straight line, 
“minimal path,” “simplest path,” “maximal determination,” etc. are mentioned. For 
the sake of simplicity, let us take only two characterizations of a straight line, (a) 
straight as no curvature, and (b) straight as a minimal path between two given points. 
We can easily see that (a) and (b) are different, in general, and that they can coincide 
only if we are talking about Euclidean geometry. And this gap between straightness 
and minimal distance should reappear as regards inertial motion! This is indeed one 
of the major reasons for my Conjecture (II). On the one hand, straightness of inertial 
motion, on the other hand, any inertial motion between two given points traverses 
a minimal path, and the difference between these two can disappear only if space is 
Euclidean. Like Huygens and Newton, Leibniz may have assumed dynamics 
presupposes Euclidean space. If so, then this should be the reason why inertial 
motion is given a special status in Leibniz’s dynamics, because then optimality 
leads to straightness. And, maybe, because of this special status, inertial motion 
resisted relativization.!
However, De Risi’s work also revealed that Leibniz had a possible escape route 
from this difficulty. If he had chosen “minimal path” instead of “straight line” as an 
S. Uchii, Monadology, Information, and Physics, Part 3/  7
essential feature of inertial motion, he might have obtained a new prospect! For, 
Leibniz has left a few papers in which he tried to determine the shortest line that 
passes from a point to another, on surfaces with constant and variable curvature (De 
Risi 2007, 236). In fact, Leibniz’s two papers from 1690’s are added in Appendix of 
De Risi’s book (592-595). Such attempts were no doubt premature (because 
Gaussian coordinates and differential geometry are needed), but they clearly show 
that Leibniz did certainly considered the possibility of Non-Euclidean space, as an 
arena for his dynamics. Thus, inertial motion taken as a motion along a “minimal 
path” may have opened a new possibility for his dynamics.!
The reader may wonder that this is merely a “wishful thinking.” But just recall 
what I have pointed out in Section 30, Part 2. In Initia Rerum Leibniz introduced the 
notion of the path of a motion. And I have pointed out that this notion can be 
extended to the situation, since a motion is nothing but a change of situation. And if 
we can remove Leibniz’s predilection for straightness of any elementary motion, a 
possible path of situation (which is equivalent with a possible state-transition of the 
phenomenal world) can be turned into a trajectory in all possible situations (similar 
to Barbour’s configuration space, utilizing our hindsight, of course). Applying the 
consideration of optimality, we should be able to determine a geodesic in this arena. 
Thus God can choose the best geodesic among all possible paths! I am not trying to 
ascribe this fancy project to Leibniz; I am merely suggesting that such potentialities 
can be entertained in view of the ideas and works Leibniz has in fact provided. !
And I may add that in Leibniz’s metaphysics, according to my informational 
interpretation, I do not see anything which requires the straightness of elementary 
motion or action (in phenomena). As I have clarified in Part 1, there is certainly a 
correspondence between metaphysics and dynamics, but since neither spatial nor 
temporal concepts are applicable to the monads, these concepts must be 
constructed on the basis of certain features of monads and their forces. And I have 
repeatedly emphasized that, in order to produce the phenomenal world with space 
and time, God’s coding is indispensable; indeed there must be at least two different 
encodings, one for representation, the other for phenomena. Leibniz has not 
provided the foundation of the law of inertia, and in his foundational 
considerations on geometry, he has failed to provide a satisfactory definition of 
straight line. However, there were various possibilities for utilizing the idea of 
optimality, for constructing dynamics, because this idea is applicable both to monads 
and to phenomena which result from the former. My Conjecture (II) is intended to 
call the reader’s attention to this. Leibniz indeed possessed a powerful means to 
connect dynamics to metaphysics!!
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To be more specific, if Leibniz were to choose optimality rather than straightness, he 
could have said: !
“since every nisus [effort ] tends to in a minimal line, it follows that all motions 
take either minimal path or are composed of such paths,” !
instead of the preceding quotation. Then, the resulting motions in our phenomena 
may be described either “classical” or “relativistic” way, or some other ways. Thus, 
obviously, the potentiality of his dynamics could have been widened! In this way, 
the reader can see the significance of my Conjecture (II). This can be relevant to the 
problem of gravity too (recall that geodesics in general relativity replaces classical 
inertia in a curved space-time, and curvature is another representation of gravity; 
see also Section 34 below).!
!
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33. Informational Interpretation as an Attempt at Unification!
Before proceeding to the hard topic of gravity, let me add a remark on my way for 
reconstructing, and for conjecturing Leibniz’s ideas and thinking. I know there are 
some influential interpreters of Leibniz who tend to deny the “picture of a unified 
Leibnizian system” (Garber 1985, 73). For instance, Daniel Garber, by criticizing 
Russell’s and Couturat’s way of interpreting Leibniz, says:!
I think that is wrong to see Leibniz’s thought as deriving from his logic, 
either as a historical or a philosophical claim. This is not because logic 
wasn’t important to Leibniz; it was, and was a source of many arguments 
and philosophical positions. Rather, I would claim, Leibniz’s philosophy 
doesn’t derive from his logic because it doesn’t derive, strictly speaking, 
from any one source at all.  (Garber 1985, 73)!
Garber argues that Leibniz’s philosophy is “a complex of interrelated and mutually 
reflecting positions, principles, and arguments”; and he proposes, “rather one 
ought to see how these domains are interconnected in Leibniz’s thought, which is, 
to use Michel Serres’ apt image, more like a net than a chain” (ibid.). But such 
phrases as “interconnected” and “like a net than a chain” are a mere catch phrase, 
rather than a clarification, unless you get into details of such interconnections. 
Garber’s long and impressive paper is rich in quotations and history of philosophy, 
but I have to confess I have learned little, as regards the interconnections between 
Leibniz’s dynamics and metaphysics, in particular, from this paper (Garber 1995 is 
much better).!
Let us see another example. Bertoloni Meli also says something similar about 
Leibniz:!
his system is based on an extraordinary complex interplay of themes and 
disciplines with no fixed centre. Neither mathematics, nor logic, nor 
metaphysics, nor theology nor any other field, can be taken to be at the 
foundations of the whole system. (Bertoloni Meli 1993, 78) !
Despite this statement, however, Bertoloni Meli has examined the details of the 
“complex interplay of themes and disciplines,” and that’s one of the most valuable 
contributions to Leibniz scholarship. And I have gained many hints from his work, 
for my own attempt at looking for a sort of unified interpretation of Leibniz’s 
physics and metaphysics.!
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Garber, in his new book (2009, 384) repeats a similar assertion as regards Leibniz’s 
project of Monadology:!
Certain metaphysical argument convinced Leibniz that, at root, simple 
substances, monads, had to be at the bottom of everything. What he hadn’t 
fully figured out, though, is how exactly bodies are to be grounded in the 
world of monads. This, I would claim was the project of the letters with de 
Volder, the letters with Des Bosses, and other texts of this period. And, I 
would claim, there is no single doctrine that one can say is the Leibnizian 
solution to that problem. There are different strands that recur throughout 
the texts, but I don’t think that he ever arrived at an answer that fully 
satisfied him.!
Well, as regards the factual statements contained in this quotation, I am not going to 
complain. But from these alleged facts, does it follow that we should not try a 
unified interpretation of Leibniz’s attempts and texts? I do not think so. Garber 
(and, to some extent, Bertoloni Meli also) is merely saying that he did not find any 
unified view in Leibniz’s texts; and this does not imply it is impossible to find any, or 
we should not try a unified interpretation. Unification is a “never ending story” in 
science and philosophy as well, and if you do not try to attribute such a story to 
Leibniz, to whom else? Monadology is in fact a manifestation of this dream, at least. !
Moreover, Leibniz’s metaphysics does seem to contain the core for possible 
unification. In Section 13, Part 1 of this paper, I assumed that the information of the 
monads is conserved, in order to discuss Leibniz’s distinction between action and 
passion. There, I assumed so simply for the sake of avoiding a digression from the 
main topic there. But, here, we can take up this “assumption” again, since, as I 
understand, this assumption is the key for any possible unification of Leibniz’s 
dynamics with metaphysics. !
The most important reason for Leibniz’s introducing substances or monads is that 
there must be the same reality, behind the ever changing world of phenomena. 
Recall that, although the state of each monad changes in one sense, the whole 
sequence of the states is given in timeless reality, and in this sense, reality is 
unchanging and remains the same. Thus, God created the timeless world of 
monads all at once, including all the sequences (transition functions, in my words) 
of their states. This totality of reality must be always the same, despite the fact that 
the phenomenal world is always changing. On this basis, I have argued that the 
conservation of living force is closely connected with the conservation of the 
primitive force, which in turn stems from the transition function of a monad (Section 
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13). I have also pointed out that the recursion of elastic collision (as the basic 
interaction among bodies) at every level of the infinite divisibility of body nicely 
corresponds to the recursive structure of the program of monads (Section 15).!
In this way, the information of reality is conserved, individually as regards each monad, 
and hence as regards the whole reality (Section 13). Thus, as long as we are talking 
about Leibniz’s philosophy, this assumption must be accepted. And this is nothing 
but the basis of any possible unification of Leibniz’s philosophy.!
Then, this assumption imposes an ideal of unification on Leibniz. I say “ideal” 
because his dynamics is not unified; it is left incomplete! But Leibniz sketched a 
scenario for unification, that (a) dynamics must be founded on metaphysics, that (b)  
space and time must be constructed or explained in terms of a relational theory, and 
(c) geometry (of space) or Analysis Situs must be founded on metaphysics. And I 
myself sketched (d) how metric time can be obtained from the succession of states 
in the monads (Sections 21-24); and I also argued that (e) even relativistic metric can 
be obtained from the same basis (Sections 27-28). According to my informational 
interpretation, I have thus tried to fill in some details (insufficient though, no 
doubt) by supplying connections between informational (metaphysical, for Leibniz) 
concepts and dynamical concepts. !
And these should be a good enough reason for trying, rather than denouncing, a 
unified interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy. My informational interpretation is, 
in fact, inspired by Leibniz’s vision manifested in Monadology. However, in order to 
pursue a unified view of Leibniz’s philosophy, I had to make my own choice among 
possible alternatives; without such a choice, it should be quite hard to obtain any 
consistent interpretation. But whenever I have made such a choice, I have indicated 
which option I have taken from the specified alternatives. And I will continue to do 
so. With this confession, let us proceed to the problem of gravity.!
!
!
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34. Gravity!
It seems that Leibniz’s treatment of gravity is one of the weakest spots of his 
dynamics. The root of the problem may be his mechanistic philosophy as regards 
the phenomenal world. According to its general strategy, gravity as well as inertia 
must be reduced to action-reaction by contact, an accumulation of a multitude of 
dead or living forces.!
In Specimen Dynamicum, after stating that all motions can be reduced to rectilinear  
motions (quoted in Section 7, Part 1), Leibniz outlines how such forces as gravity or 
centripetal force can be explained.!
From this it not only follows that what moves in a curved path always tries 
[conari] to proceed in a straight line tangent to it, but also—something 
utterly unexpected—that the true notion of solidity derives from this. … For if 
we assume something we call solid is rotating around its center, its parts all 
try [conabuntur] to fly off on the tangent; indeed, they will actually begin to 
fly off. But since this mutual separation disturbs the motion of the 
surrounding bodies, they are repelled back, that is, thrust back together 
again, as if the center contained a magnetic force for attracting them, or as if 
the parts themselves contained a centripetal force. Thus, the rotation arises 
from the composition of the rectilinear nisus for receding on the tangent and 
the centripetal conatus among the parts. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 135-136)!
This qualitative description may look insufficient, but Leibniz actually applied this 
senario, in mathematical and quantitative terms, to planetary motion in his 
Tentamen (1689), as was already mentioned. And although he could reproduce not 
all of Newton’s major results, he succeeded in giving some credibility to this 
scenario, depending on the tradition of vortex theory, and without assuming any 
“action-at-a-distance” like Newton’s attractive force. His view on solidity, however, 
is problematic (for, once we get into quantitative calculation of the strength of 
gravity, we will immediately see the invalidity of Leibniz’s view), although it is 
understandable in view of the importance he gave to the notion of elasticity (a 
principle of interaction among bodies). !
Now, Leibniz’s scenario seems credible as far as it can show that some counter force 
has to work in order to keep a circular motion or a curvilinear motion. However, 
since it needs an additional assumption of vortex which carries a planet, and 
moreover the assumption of harmonic circulation (the velocity of rotation is inversely 
proportional to the radius), the question of their foundation remains. Leibniz’s 
ingenious trick for producing an elliptic orbit of a planet is that he introduced two 
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opposite tendencies along the radius of the harmonic circulation: one is centrifugal 
force, and another is gravity (see Bertoloni Meli 1993, 117). Gravity is explained in 
terms of a multitude of impacts from ether, pushing the planet towards the center 
of circulation. Depending on the balance of these two forces, the orbit can deviate 
from the circle of harmonic circulation and become elliptic.!
Despite this ingenuity, an additional difficulty remains, for explaining orbits of 
comets which moves across the plane of orbits of the planets. Moreover, it seems 
quite hard to adapt his theory to the universal character of gravity, by relying on the 
vortex theory. Like inertial motions, gravity seems to work irrespective of directions 
in space. Presumably because of such difficulties, Leibniz tried other ideas in his 
“Zweite Bearbeitung” (written probably 1689-1690; see Bertoloni Meli 1993, 155, 
306), a revised version of Tentamen.!
In this revised version, he changed his model for explaining gravity. Instead of the 
fluid carrying a planet, he now considers a fluid emitted from the center of 
revolution, and he uses an analogy with light, for suggesting the inverse square law. 
And this time, it is assumed that gross bodies (planets, e.g.) have many pores, and 
the assumed fluid penetrates these pores. Now, depending on the distance from the 
center, any such bodies are penetrated by the same fluid according to the inverse 
square law (density of the fluid in the body); thus this fluid can be the cause of 
gravity acting according to that proportion. It may seem strange, but this fluid is a 
medium producing an attractive force between the center and the body. Although this 
idea is fanciful, it has two important features: (a) the inverse square law by analogy 
of light, and (b) the action of this fluid takes time, in order to reach another body. 
Thus it may suite the taste of the modern reader! And I myself am inclined to 
consider this change as another signal of Leibniz’s informational turn. The 
mechanism of production of attractive force is widely left open, indeed, but at least 
the route and medium of gravitational interaction between two bodies are indicated. !
Leibniz repeated the same ideas several times in his later years. For instance, in a 
letter to Johann Bernoulli (18 Nov. 1698), he writes:!
It was my opinion long before Newton’s work, that gravity is inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance, a theory at which I arrived not 
merely by a posteriori processes but also by an a priori reason which I am 
surprised that he did not notice. Leaving out of consideration the physical 
basis of gravity namely, and remaining within mathematical concepts, I 
consider gravity as an attraction caused by certain radii or attractive lines 
going out from an attracting center; so like the density of illumination in 
S. Uchii, Monadology, Information, and Physics, Part 3/  14
rays of light, the density of radiation in gravitational attraction will be 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the radiant point 
…. (Loemker 1969, 513)!
The qualification “remaining within mathematical concepts” may be understood as 
suggesting a possible “phenomenal expression” of an informational interaction 
between two groups of monads (underlying gravitational attraction), as I have 
suggested in Part 1.!
Again, in Illustratio Tentaminis de Motuum Coelestium Causis (c. 1705, henceforth 
Illustratio) , the same model and analogy are repeated (pt. 1 sect. 2; both Tentamen 
and Illustratio have been translated into Japanese, in vol. 9, Shimomura et al. eds., 
1999). And a mathematical proof of the inverse square law, as a general feature of 
any radiation, is provided with a figure (ibid.). This figure is adapted with an 
explanation, as the following Figure 23. !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Figure 23: Radiation and the Inverse Square Law!
Although several radii in Figure 23 are added by myself, this addition is quite in 
conformity with Leibniz’s own idea. And the reader may notice a striking affinity 
of these radii with Faraday’s line of electric force, or of magnetic force. In fact, in 
the introduction of “Zweite Bearbeitung,” there is a reference to Gilbert’s theory of 
magnetism (see Bertoloni Meli 1993, 156). And also recall that penetration of light 
S. Uchii, Monadology, Information, and Physics, Part 3/  15
The number of radii is the same, but the
area increases  in proportion to the
square of the distance from the center 
E
A B
F
Radii
The density of radii on 
concentric surfaces is 
determined by the
inverse square law
and magnetism through the “vacuum” was one of Leibniz’s reasons against the 
emptiness in the alleged “vacuum” region (after all, “ether” persisted and coexisted 
until the beginning of the 20th century, together with electro-magnetic field).!
Further, in Leibniz’s 5th paper to Clarke, he refers to the same ideas, and 
generalizes this model to all phenomena of gravity.!
For, both quicksilver and water, are masses of heavy matter, full of pores, 
through which there passes a great deal of matter void of heaviness …; such 
as is probably that of the rays of light, and other insensible fluids; and 
especially that which is itself the cause of gravity of gross bodies, by 
receding from the center towards which it drives those bodies. … the 
gravity of sensible bodies towards the center of earth, ought to be produced 
by the motion of some fluid. (sect. 35, Alexander 1956, 66)!
The phrase “matter void of heaviness” (graviton?) would strike the modern reader! 
However, it must be pointed out that, if gravity works generally, between the sun 
and the earth, between planets, between a stone and the earth, etc., the flow of such 
insensible fluids (kinds of ether) must be mutual! If two bodies attract each other, 
this action-reaction is mutual and depends on the mass of each body; which means 
that the flow of fluids from one is accompanied by another reversed flow from the 
latter to the former. I have been unable to find Leibniz’s explicit statement on this 
point, but I presume that this is the case. Otherwise, gravity cannot be a principle of 
motion comparable with the law of inertia. But on this presumption, Leibniz’s 
simple derivation of the inverse square law may become problematic (as regards 
gravity); at least it must be appropriately explained.!
Anyway, it should be clear that such a model may disturb his own explanation in 
terms of the vortex theory, although it may be in conformity with the assumption of 
ether. One of the main reasons why he adheres to the vortex theory is that all 
planets moves on the same plane, and Newton cannot provide any reason for this. 
But, whether or not Leibniz had less confidence in the vortex theory (but adhering 
to the assumption of ether) in his later years, Leibniz must have to go back to his 
metaphysics, for grounding any such theories, in addition to empirical 
confirmation. Thus we are led to the metaphysical foundation of gravity. In Leibniz’s 
days no one could imagine theories of field, presumably because of the 
preconception of the vortex theory and the rudimentary knowledge of electro-
magnetic phenomena.!
In sum then, Leibniz’s treatment of gravity seems to have two aspects: (i) One, that 
is firmly rooted in the tradition of the vortex theory and mechanistic philosophy, 
S. Uchii, Monadology, Information, and Physics, Part 3/  16
which tries to reduce gravity to local action by contact, and (ii) the other, that seeks a 
more general feature, such as elasticity or the law governing gravity. As I 
understand, although Leibniz’s strategy may look ambivalent between (i) and (ii), 
these have coexisted, and in later years, (ii) became more prevalent. On the 
assumption of this reading, then, we can suggest a similar move for Leibniz as that 
in our previous case of the foundation of inertia. Thus the following is my third 
conjecture:!
(Conjecture III) Gravity, as well as inertia, can be considered as a universal 
feature of the world, so that the foundation of both may be suspected to 
have a common root. Just as the foundation of inertia may be obtained by 
optimality of the path of the situation (in the whole world), so may be the 
foundation of gravity.!
The reader may criticize this by saying “it is too much contaminated by our 
hindsight.” I will not deny that there is indeed some contamination, from our 
knowledge of Einstein’s theory of gravity. But we can find some ground for this 
conjecture in Leibniz’s own text. As Bertoloni Meli (1993) points out, !
In the Hypothesis Physica Nova of 1671 Leibniz explained gravity and 
elasticity in terms of interaction between the aether and matter. (53)!
That is to say, gravity and elasticity are somehow similarly treated; and since 
elasticity is given, as we have seen in Part 1, the status of basic interaction between 
bodies (repeated at all levels of infinite divisibility of matter), so is gravity, by 
analogy. And this is not an isolated evidence. See another remark by Bertoloni Meli:!
In Propositiones Quaedam Physicae of 1672 Leibniz assumed that the whole 
universe is elastic and that elasticity and gravity differ only in name. A body 
lifted in the air would be heavy because the elasticity of the universe would 
tend to restore the original position of equilibrium through a series of 
impacts. (ibid.)!
“Elasticity of the universe” is again a striking expression. The universe has many 
spots where “elastic force” becomes uneven (stress is there, and this is nothing but 
internal energy; see Sections 8, 28), and this in turn dictates a body there, “how it 
should move.” This reminds me of J. A. Wheeler’s famous dictum: “Space tells 
matter how to move, and matter tells space how to curve” (Misner, Thorne, and 
Wheeler 1973, 5).!
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Further, Bertoloni Meli quotes the following from Leibniz’s letter to Jacob Bernoulli 
(3 Dec. 1703, Bretoloni Meli’s own translation from Latin, Gerhardt M, vol. 3, 81)!
I hold all the bodies of the universe to be elastic, not through in themselves, 
but because of the fluids flowing between them, which on the other hand 
consist of elastic parts, and this state of affairs proceeds in infinitum. (55)!
Together with other quotations in this Section, these statements by Leibniz clearly 
show that the view expressed in these is a consistent trend as regards gravity, in 
Leibniz’s thinking from 1670’s to his later years. My Conjecture (III) is based on this 
fact, and I have only added the connection with Analysis Situs and optimality, 
which are also one of the prominent tenets in Leibniz, and closely connected with 
his saying that “everything is connected” in our world.!
In order to support my Conjecture (III), I can even suggest a possible way to 
connect gravity with situation, as follows. The situation of the whole phenomenal 
world is determined by the distribution of bodies in the world. And, by our result 
in Part 2, each body has its own internal energy (living force); in other words, the 
distribution of bodies may be considered as a distribution of energy in the world (a 
certain amount of living force is contained in each body, as internal energy). This 
idea is certainly in conformity with Leibniz’s idea of elasticity of the whole world, as 
he sometimes likened gravity as a kind of elasticity. As we have seen in Section 6, 
Part 1, any collision of bodies is governed by such internal energies, according to 
Leibniz. Thus, situation, gravity, energy (living force), and elasticity can be united! 
To this, add that the conservation of living force is, ultimately, derived from the 
conservation of information. I just imagine that this could have been Leibniz’s grand 
vision! !
Namely, (1) the conservation of information in the monads, (2) the conservation of living 
force in the phenomenal world, despite continual changes of its situation 
(distribution of bodies), (3) situation in the phenomenal world as determining 
geometry, (4) change of situation (i.e., motion) prescribed by program (seen from the 
monadic world) as well as by dynamic laws (seen in the phenomenal world), (5) 
inertia and gravity resulting from the geometrical structure of the world via elastic 
collisions. All these are united together! Moreover, the laws governing inertia and 
gravity may be obtained by applying the optimality principle in the light of 
experience (a possible example is Barbour’s attempt, Appendix to Section 30).!
May I remind the reader that I have been repeating another conjecture (which may 
have seemed radical to many people): that the phenomenal world is a huge cellular 
automaton composed of all bodies floating in the sea of ether, including the sea 
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itself, and this cellular automaton results from the whole monadic cellular 
automaton composed of all smaller cellular automata (organized groups of 
monads). However, at present, I cannot supply any specific description as regards 
the program of such automata. The preceding (1)-(5) are nothing but the expected 
results of these programs. Accordingly, this conjecture is too general, but I would 
claim that this conjecture is baed on Leibniz’s own ideas. All we can say at this 
stage is that the flow of information in the monadic cellular automaton (the world 
of monads) is the basis of of the phenomena of inertia and gravity, in particular, as 
is suggested by (1)-(5).!
 Here, we may also recall that when we talk about the preceding monadic cellular 
automaton (where numerous smaller automata are communicating with each 
other), this is another way (“as if”-mode) to express the operation of a single monad, 
as I have pointed out in Section 13 in relation to Leibniz’s Demon; each single 
monad can represent the whole world. But whichever mode we adopt, it is clear 
that the details are widely left open (even for our contemporary physics, we should 
emphasize!). !
!
!
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35. The Flexibility and the Unity of Leibniz’s Philosophy!
If we may rely on our hindsight, however, it is easy to continue my Conjecture (III) 
as follows: Both inertia and gravity are closely connected with the structure of 
space and time, according to Einstein’s theory of gravity. Thus, when Leibniz said 
“motion is a change of situation” and “the analysis of situation provides the 
foundation of geometry (of the actual world, in particular),” he certainly hit the 
mark. Moreover, as we have already seen in this paper, Leibniz’s theory of 
dynamics and metaphysics, because of its two-layer structure, is amazingly flexible. 
His whole theory (including metaphysics and dynamics as its core) can adapt itself 
to various possibilities of space, time, and dynamics. The reason for this flexibility 
can be explained, more specifically, and by way of a summary of the whole paper, 
as follows.!
(1) Leibniz’s world of monads can be interpreted as the source of invariant 
information, and this produces various invariant structures. “Invariant” in the sense 
that, in whatever manner these structures may be expressed or represented, they 
remain the same. As I have repeatedly asserted, the world of monads exists without 
space and without time. This means that various theories of space and time can be 
constructed on the same structures. Further, all the changes of monadic states are 
given at once, and the transition functions (containing all the information) which 
determine these changes are the source of invariant structures. Thus the 
possibilities of dynamics (which we humans can construct) are also widely open.!
(2) On the basis of such invariant structures, Leibniz can introduce various means 
for producing various representations and appearances (phenomena). When 
Leibniz says that “a monad represents the whole world in its own way,” and when 
he distinguishes “well-founded phenomena” from other phenomena, he clearly 
implies this. Thus, in this paper, I have adopted formal expressions such as R(W) or 
Ph(R(W)), in order to make this point explicit. The reason why we have to 
distinguish R and Ph has been explained (Section 21). And, although Leibniz 
seldom says explicitly, both representations and phenomena need (I would 
emphasize, logically) coding, respectively. Described in this way, it becomes quite 
clear that Leibniz’s metaphysics can be rightly called informational. This is really an 
amazing innovation!!
(3) As a consequence of these two points, it should be clear that the program of the 
monads and the coding for representation and phenomena are the key for whatever 
happens in the phenomenal world. How can we, finite humans, know these? 
Leibniz assumed certain (qualitative) correspondences between the world of monads 
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and the phenomena. These are homomorphisms (partial isomorphism). And since 
Leibniz’s mechanistic philosophy dictates we should explain phenomena in terms 
of motions, dynamics is given the status as the primary means for knowing not only 
the laws of phenomena but also the invariant structures of the world of monads.!
(4) However, it may seem hard to point out, in Leibniz’s texts, relevant statements 
as regards decoding, i.e., the method for knowing the original programs of monads 
from phenomena. It may be that Leibniz had little means for working out his 
metaphysics, as an ambitious theory of information. Aside from isomorphism and 
homomorphism, what he has explicitly mentioned is a “divine machine,” various 
bodies resulting from an organized group of monads. I have pointed out that this 
corresponds to von Neumann’s cellular automaton. A recent trend in Leibniz 
scholarship may be termed “biological” (see Smith 2011, Smith and Nachtomy 
2011), and proponents of this trend also emphasize the importance of “divine 
machine.” But unfortunately, there are very few references to the theory of 
information, or to cellular automaton, which, according to my own view, is 
indispensable for clarifying this “divine machine.” And what I have emphasized in 
Section 12 is that God’s organization of monads into many groups (each has its own 
entelechy) is crucially important for understanding Leibniz’s dynamics, rather than 
biology! !
(5) Because, bodies are situated in the world, and this discloses important 
information of the world of monads, where monads are also organized. Thus  
geometry of space is at least one essential key for our decoding, for inferring God’s 
message through phenomena. Then, by an obvious analogy, motion and time are 
also another key for decoding, since motion is a change of situation, and time is 
nothing but encoded expression of the order of succession of monadic states. Thus, 
although Leibniz himself did not have any such concepts as encoding or decoding, 
he is in effect saying that dynamics is an essential tool for decoding, for knowing the 
invariant structures of the world of monads.!
(6) In this way, Leibniz has at least indicated how we should try to decode. But, of 
course, details are widely left open. His most optimistic statement is given in terms 
of “Leibniz’s Demon” (Section 13), and I have shown two possible ways to make 
this idea meaningful in his dynamics (Sections 26 and 27). And in this process, I 
have also shown how we can construct different systems of space and time, starting 
from the same invariant structures in the monadic world. This implies that the 
same can be said with respect to dynamics; since Leibniz’s (metaphysical) invariant 
structures are informational (not physical) at bottom, this flexibility is easily 
obtained.!
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(7) Then, the next question is: Given this flexibility of Leibniz’s philosophy, what 
instruction can he give us, as regards our choice of a best theory of dynamics? The 
answer seems obvious to me. He would surely recommend the use of the optimality 
principle, but only in the light of our experience! The reader may wonder: “why 
experience?” Leibniz does not deny the importance of experience at all, because 
phenomena are, to him, mostly appearances of the activities of monads in one way or 
another. We have to distinguish well-founded phenomena from others, but Leibniz 
has the distinction of qualitative and quantitative features of phenomena. Well-
founded phenomena are the products of the monads via God’s coding, and 
quantities come from this coding. Thus, since well-founded phenomena are all 
coded messages of God, we have to base any of our theories on them. We humans may 
imagine any hypotheses we like, but in order to decode the phenomena and to know 
God’s message, we have to essentially rely on experience. I think this is Leibniz’s 
metaphysical empiricism, and the optimality principle must be used on this 
assumption.!
(8) Needless to say, the optimality principle in various forms, such as the principle 
of least action, or the variational principle, is mostly advocated, refined, and used 
by later people, especially after analytical mechanics was established. But Leibniz 
was by far the most prominent figure, among his contemporaries, advocating the 
basic vision, and several ideas in mathematics, dynamics, and especially in 
metaphysics. Thus my reference to this principle is not anachronism. Despite the 
fact Leibniz’s version is vague or ambiguous, it is one of his major tenets. And I 
have indicated, in Sections 32 and 34, a possible way how Leibniz could have 
applied an optimality principle to the problem of inertia and gravity.!
Although my research on the informational interpretation of Leibniz still continues, 
I may stop here. My last statement at this stage is, in view of (1)-(8), my 
informational interpretation is qualified as a unified interpretation of Leibniz’s 
philosophy. Of course, it is not derived from any single discipline, but I think I have 
shown how various elements of Leibniz’s philosophy can be tightly unified around 
the core of his theory of information, i.e., Monadology.!
For the sake of the reader’s convenience, I will add the Synopsis of the paper so far 
(Part 1, 2, and 3), as an Appendix.!
!
!
!
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!
Appendix: The Synopsis of the Paper!
Part 1: Metaphysics and Dynamics!!
1. Preliminaries!
! Leibniz’s informational turn/Whole series of change given at once/!
! Phenomena, space, and time/Need for coding!
2. Leibniz on Forces!
! Impenetrability and inertia/Active force, passive force!
3. Specimen Dynamicum!
! Motion does not exist/What is active force?/“Act on” and “being acted on”!
4. How does Dynamics correspond to Metaphysics? (Figure 1: Inertial Motions 
change Situation)!
! Significance of analysis situs/Motion as a change of situation/Force even in 
! inertial motion!
5. Living Force and Dead Force (Figure 2: Leibniz’s reconstruction of Acceleration)!
! How Leibniz reconstructs acceleration!
6. Collisions and Relativity of Motion (Figure 3: Collision of Two Bodies, Figure 4: 
Collision and the Center of Gravity)!
! Infinite divisibility/Collision and elasticity/Collision and relativity/!
! Conservation of living force due to elasticity!
7. All Motion is Rectilinear or composed of Rectilinear Motions!
! Effort gives rise to force, and tends to in a straight line!
8. Living Force: Total and Partial!
! Partial living force may imply internal energy!
9. Active vs. Passive in Monadology!
! Active and passive/How should we interpret this distinction?!
10.  The Structure of a Program: Turing Machine (Figure 5: Turing Machine)!
! Nested recursion!
11.  A Program has a Structure with many Layers!
! Active and passive in the hierarchy of programs/Leibniz was aware of !
! recursion!
12.  Divine Machines and Cellular Automata (Figure 6: Von Neumann’s Cellular 
Space, Figure 7:  Leibniz’s Cellular Space)!
! Flow of information/Organization of bodies and of monads/Leibniz and !
! cellular automata/Program and its subprograms!
13.  Relativity of Action and Passion, based on Recursion!
! Active and passive are relative/Recursion is crucial/Leibniz’s Demon!
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14.  Recursion in the Phenomena!
! Elastic collision recurs/Program version of the law of inertia!
15.  Collisions and Programs!
! Program version of elastic collision/“Living mirror” as recursion!!
Part 2: Space and Time!!
16.  Space and Anaysis Situs (Figure 8: Relational Place, Figure 9: Interval and  !              
Metric)!
! De Risi’s work on Analysis Situs/Metric and geometrical quantity/Time is 
! different from space!
17.  From Situation to Space!
! Space according to Analysis Situs!
18.  How can Time be joined to Space?!
! Analogy between time and space/Oder of succession is the basis of time!
19.  Arthur on Leibniz’s Time!
! Significance of Initia Rerum/Arthur’s reconstruction/Arthur neglected order 
! of states!
20.  J. A. Cover’s Improvement?!
! Cover introduced “world-state”/But neglected order again!
21.  A Finite Model of Monads (Figure 10: A Finite Model with 4 Monads)!
! My reconstruction illustrated by a model/My model preserves order/Points 
! out a hidden premise!
   Appendix to Section 21 (Figure 11: World-States by 1-to-1 Correspondence)!
! Proof of my assertions!
22.  Summary of my Interpretation of Leibniz’s Basis of Time!
! Leibniz’s view as regards the basis of time/Activities and changes in the !
! timeless world!
23.  Metric Time in Phenomena!
! Leibniz on magnitude of time/Time can be reduced to space via motion/The 
! path of motion can be perceived simultaneously/Minimal path and straight 
! line!
24.  How to introduce Temporal Congruence? (Figure 12: Inertial Motion and Unit  
Time, Figure 13: Proportion of Two Speeds)!
! Assuming inertial motion, temporal congruence can be defined/But !
! uniformity is presupposed!
25.  Relativity of Motion and Simultaneity!
! Simultaneity in the phenomenal world/Two possibilities, Classical and !
! relativistic!
26.  Classical Time in Leibniz’s Dynamics!
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! Order of succession in the monads can be transformed to metric time in !
! classical way/Metric is produced via coding for phenomena!
27.  Relativistic Metric in Leibniz (Figure 14: Bi-metric Relativity for Humans and 
Angels)!
! Relativistic metric is also possible with no change in Leibniz’s metaphysics/
! Moreover, even a bi-metric system is possible on the same basis/Leibniz’s 
! demon is possible even with relativistic metric!
28.  Mass and Energy!
! The relation of mass and energy can be incorporated in Leibniz’s dynamics, 
! in conformity with his notion of partial living force!
29.  What is the Problem with Inertia and Relativity? (Figure 15: Can Relativity be 
Generalized?)!
! Leibniz did not discuss the foundation of the law of inertia/Law of inertia 
! inconsistent with wholesale relativity!
30.  How can Leibniz establish the Law of Inertia?!
! Leibniz’s last research on Analysis Situs shows he is still ambivalent as !
! regards his definition of straight line/But the notion of path can be extended  
! to the whole situation/Why not apply optimality to paths?!
Appendix to Section 30: Barbour’s Platonia and Shape Space (Figure 16: A   !
Configuration Space, Figure 17: Platonia for Possible Triangles, Figure 18: Two 
Representations of Planetary Motion, Figure 19: Shape Space and the Planetary 
Motion)!
! Barbour’s relational dynamics has many things in common with Leibniz’s 
! dynamics!!
Part 3: Inertia and Gravity!!
31. Newton’s Bucket and Inertia (Figure 20: Huygens on Centrifugal Force, Figure 
21: Huygens found a Motion similar to Free Fall, Figure 22: Relativity of Inertial 
Motion?)!
! In order to consider Leibniz’s position as regards the law of inertia, Newton’s 
! bucket is a good starting point/Huygens’ work on centrifuge force is !
! illuminating in many ways/Conjecture I: Leibniz could have entertained the 
! relativity of inertial motion!
32. Straight or Shortest?!
! Conjecture II: there was a struggle in Leibniz between his predilection for !
! straight line and his adherence to optimality principle!
33. Informational Interpretation as an Attempt at Unification!
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! The reasons for trying unified interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy/!
! Monadology implies the conservation of information, which can be the core of 
! unification!
34. Gravity (Figure 23: Radiation and the Inverse Square Law)!
! Leibniz’s treatment of gravity is not impressive/But after Tentamen, he !
! changed his model for gravity/Analogy between light and gravity suggests 
! the inverse square law and a flow of gravitational force/Because of his !
! insistence on the connection of elasticity and gravity, gravity may be !
! regarded as another basic interaction/Conjecture III:gravity as well as inertia 
! may be a universal feature of the phenomenal world, and they may have a 
! common root.!
35. The Flexibility and the Unity of Leibniz’s Philosophy!
! The unity of Leibniz’s metaphysics and dynamics stems from Monadology as 
! a theory of information. The monads and their transition functions are the !
! source of invariant structures, and the world of monads is always the same. !
! On this basis, coding of representation and coding of phenomena are added, 
! and these are the source of amazing flexibility.!
!
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